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INTRODUCTION
Should the music industry forget about convincing consumers to comply with
copyright law? Anyone moved to despair over the possibility can be forgiven. As
massive and persistent filesharing signals, people-at least a substantial proportion
of people-no longer feel obligated to obey copyright law. Social norms'
followed by large numbers of people apparently clash with copyright law.
Faced with a law-norms clash, the easiest solution may seem to be to change
the law. The process for amending a statute is known and the steps are clear,
although the politics of changing any law of consequence are challenging. As the
Schoolhouse Rock! series demonstrated, the entire process can be explained to
children via a catchy song illustrated with a cartoon.2 By contrast, there is no
procedural manual for changing social norms and certainly no cute song or
cartoon. Indeed, the invitation to this Symposium implied that legislative change
was in order as it invited the authors to write about how the law might evolve to
resolve "the disconnect between 20th Century laws and 21st Century attitudes"
regarding copyright.
This Article contends that when laws and social norms clash, the law need not
necessarily change. A significant law-norms clash signals that a problem exists,
but its existence does not dictate the strategy for addressing it. There are actually
several strategies for resolving a law-norms clash, and acceding to norms by
changing the law is only one of several strategies. This Article surveys and
assesses the potential strategies and contends that strategies that persuade people
to comply with the law are likely still more practicable than sweeping changes to
the law itself.
While nobody contends that law must always yield to norms, persuading people
to respect the copyright of musical recordings seems like a lost cause to many.
There is ample reason to be pessimistic that a law can be salvaged when mass
numbers of people disregard laws of general applicability.3 Some of the most
prominent instances of similar law-norms clashes end with norms overcoming law.
The case of Prohibition comes to mind most prominently, where people's
' At this point in an article on law and social norms, it is obligatory to define social norms.
Richard McAdams says: social norms are "informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated
to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of fear of external non-legal sanctions,
or both." Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Rgulafion of Norms, 96 MtCH. L.
REV. 338, 340 (1997).
2 Schoolhouse Rock" I'mJust a Bill (ABC television broadcast 1973), lyrics available athttp://www.
schoolhouserock.tv/Bill.html.
' For example, Daniel Gervals made a good case five years ago that social norms would
eventually require the adoption of a liability regime. See Daniel Gervais, The Price of Social Norms:
Towards a Labily Regime for Fike-Sharing, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39 (2004).
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inclination to drink led to the only repeal of a Constitutional Amendment. Indeed,
earlier this year, Lawrence Lessig invoked the example of Prohibition in calling for
an end to the peer-to-peer (P2P) wars through sweeping changes to copyright
law.
4
Other familiar examples of norms overcoming law abound. The repeal,
invalidation, or non-enforcement of most laws regulating consensual sexual
relations is one. Even where laws that clash with norms remain in place, they
often seem somewhat futile and lacking in moral force. For example, driving on
most U.S. highways demonstrates that few people have qualms about disregarding
speed limits. Finally, where social norms have yielded to law, it has sometimes
first required a difficult, even violent struggle-for example, court orders and laws
that guaranteed civil rights for African Americans sometimes required the
intervention of armed troops to quell mass resistance.
The case for cautious optimism in the face of a law-norms clash thus requires
considerable and careful explanation. Despite reasonable pessimism when laws
of general application clash with social norms, policy makers are not always
obliged to either surrender to the inevitability of norms or fight a titanic battle to
impose the law. The menu of policy options is flexible and varied, and prospects
are more encouraging than they may seem at first glance. Experience and logic
show that there are primarily four choices for resolving a norms-law clash:
1. Surrender. Changing the Law or Abandoning Enforcement. As
discussed thus far, changing laws in light of mass resistance to
them is indeed one option. Sometimes the triumph of social
norms over existing law is achieved by repealing or altering the
law. In other instances, the law is no longer enforced and may
be virtually forgotten (e.g., laws against adultery).
2. Deterrence: Ramping Up -Enforcement and Penalties. In some
instances, those who enforce the law are not inclined to
surrender to social norms that run counter to the law. Instead,
they increase enforcement or seek harsher penalties in order to
deter wrongdoing.
3. Adaptation: Finding Other Ways to Combat the Problem. Two
somewhat contradictory ciches serve to describe the two faces
of this strategy: "There's more than one way to skin a cat," and,
"If you can't beat 'em, join 'em." Sometimes law need not be
abandoned nor enforced more aggressively, but rather, different
approaches to achieve the same goal can be tried.5 In other
Lawrence Lessig, Our New Prohibjiion, PLAYBOY, Apr. 2009, at 115.
Such adaptive approaches can be as simple as fences and locks or as complex as community
3
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instances, officials or private rights holders may acquiesce to
norms while directing those norms toward more beneficial
outcomes.6
4. Persuasion: Changing Norms. Sometimes, when law and social
norms clash, it is norms that eventually give way to the law. In
some instances, concerted action by officials or civil society can
bring social norms into line with the law.
Choosing among the four options for addressing a clash between law and
social norms requires addressing practical and normative questions that stand
apart from the fact that a particular behavior is common or deemed acceptable by
most or a significant number of people. In some instances, clinging to a law that
defies norms is too costly or unacceptably impinges on people's freedoms. In
other instances, however, the interests at stake are too important-financially or
normatively-to surrender.
Part I of this Article considers the pros and cons of surrendering to social
norms by reforming a law. This decision typically requires consideration of cost-
benefit analyses, normative principles, and practical politics. The decision is thus
never dictated merely by the existence of a disconnect between law and norms,
nor by the size of the disconnect. When applied to the case of copyright in
musical recordings, these considerations-particularly the practical ones-likely
require resort to other options. Part II then surveys the other options in detail,
first considering each one in general, and then in light of the specific challenges
facing the music industry. Each strategy has its virtues and limitations. Part III
offers a few recommendations for reconciling copyright law and social norms by
combining the best aspects of each alternate strategy.
I. WHEN IS SURRENDER THE RIGHT OPTION? CHANGING THE
LAW OR ABANDONING ENFORCEMENT
The question of whether a law-norms clash justifies capitulation to norms
rarely yields an easy answer. First, one must consider the costs and benefits of
maintaining the status quo compared to changing the law. The cost of enforcing
a law that contradicts norms can be high indeed, given the essential role that
norms play in securing compliance with law. One must also consider moral and
pragmatic questions. In applying these considerations to the clash between
policing. In either instance, the illegal behavior is attacked indirectly. See infra notes 58-62 and
accompanying text.
6 In other words, an owner might change her business model.
[Vol. 17:59
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copyright law and social norms, it appears that the case for changing law is not
clear cut, and in any event, may not be practical.
A. HOW NORMS OVERCOME LAWS
Norms overcome law in two situations. First, laws are repealed or substantially
altered in light of changing social norms. The example of the Twenty-first
Amendment's repeal of Prohibition is one of the more famous examples of such
a change. Other examples are laws criminalizing consensual sexual conduct.
These were repealed over the years in many states, and are now considered likely
to be invalid in light of Lawrence v. Texas.7 In these instances, the new social norm
is formally recognized in law through legislative or judicial action.
Sometimes, however, norms overcome law in less clear-cut ways, as the laws
are not repealed, but instead are no longer enforced. Police and prosecutors
sometimes decline to enforce laws or are not allocated the resources necessary to
do so.' In some of these instances, the clash between norms remains
controversial. For example, the pornography industry, which once was
constrained by obscenity laws, has grown exponentially. Although many political
leaders continued to condemn pornography,9 obscenity prosecutions declined and
virtually disappeared throughout the presidential administrations of Bill Clinton
and George W. Bush as the pornography industry vastly expanded. ° As one
prosecutor observed: "When there are porn films in Holiday Inn or the Hilton,
what do you expect?""
B. DETERMINING WHEN TO CHOOSE THE SURRENDER STRATEGY
The decision whether to alter a law when it clashes with norms requires
consideration of several factors. First, the direct costs of enforcement, in light of
norms of non-compliance must be weighed against the potential benefits if
7 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (recognizing the right to privacy in matters of consensual, adult sexual
activity).
s See Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV. 607 (2000) (discussing how authorities sometimes resist enforcing laws that greatly diverge
from social norms).
9 Congress has repeatedly attempted to regulate both obscenity and indecency on the internet,
although their success has been tempered by the Supreme Court's partial invalidation of these laws
on First Amendment grounds. President Bush's first Attorney General, John Ashcroft, declared
obscenity prosecution to be a priority, but not much came of it. See Tim Wu, American Lawbreaking:
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compliance is secured. A second consideration is the indirect costs that arise from
either changing the law or continuing to enforce a law that defies norms. A third
consideration is the political challenge of changing the law. Finally, moral
principles are essential to consider and may ultimately be determinative.
Enforcing a law that clashes with social norms may simply prove too costly.
An historical example is Prohibition.12  Because a large number of people
continued to drink, bootlegging, smuggling, and selling alcohol were profitable
illegal businesses. Defiance of the law was pervasive, and criminal enterprises
thrived and spread. Prohibition thus enriched and strengthened organized crime
while simultaneously over-taxing law enforcement resources. With no end in
sight, and waning popular support for the law, it ultimately was repealed. In the
end, one reason for repeal was that the costs were deemed to outweigh the
benefits. 3
The historical example of Prohibition illustrates a more general principle:
efficient and affordable law enforcement requires that most people comply with
the law voluntarily, either because they prefer to behave legally in general or
because they respect the specific law in question. 4 If people were to comply with
a law ony because they believe that they will get caught and punished, then in most
cases authorities would need to expend a lot of resources to convince them this
is so.' In fact, researchers contend that homicide is the rare instance of a law
where authorities dedicate enough resources to enforcement to generate a
perception of credible deterrence (the chance of getting arrested is 67%).6
Fortunately, studies show that most people do indeed voluntarily comply with
law for normative reasons rather than only because of fear of punishment.
7
12 Cf. ANDREW SINCLAIR, PROHIBITION: THE ERA OF EXCESS (1962) (providing a definitive
history of Prohibition).
13 Another reason was that many saw nothing wrong with drinking (a preference revealed by
their behavior), and objected to the interference with their conduct.
14 Voluntary support for the law might arise from internal motivations-what people believe
is moral-or external motivations-a desire for approval by others. See Robert B. Cialdini et al., A
Focus Theor. ofNormative Conduct: A Theoretical Refinement and Reevaluation of the Role ofNorms in Human
Behavior, 24 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 201 (1991). In either event, the fear of
detection and punishment by authorities is not the primary motivation for compliance. Id.
"s Most people underestimate the risk of getting caught, thus adding to the need to spend
resources on, and convey the reality of, effective enforcement. See Paul H. Robinson & John M.
Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its
Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 954-55 (2003) [hereinafter Robinson & Darley, Rok of Deterrence]; Paul H.
Robinson &John M. Darley, The Utiko of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 453, 461-62 (1997) [hereinafter
Robinson & Darley, Utidly of Desert]. There are some natural exceptions-offenses that are easily
detected and quickly sanctioned. For example, violations of public nudity laws, open container laws,
or even traffic offenses. Controlling behavior that is non-public or easily hidden is much harder.
16 See Robinson & Darley, Util' of Desert, supra note 15, at 459.
17 ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 178 (1990) (reviewing studies); Robinson &
[Vol. 17:59
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When surveyed, people are most likely to claim they obey the law for moral
reasons.'" More important, their actions appear to confirm this assertion. Studies
of people's behavior have found that social norms appear to have the most
influence on compliance. 9
The downside of the influence of social norms is that if social norms run
counter to the law, then disobedience is more likely and enforcement is more
costly. Sociologist Tom Tyler found that research indicated that about 20% of the
variance in compliance with law is "explained by differences in judgments about
the morality of the law."2 Moreover, if people's behavior is only restrained by
their belief that they are likely to get caught and punished, then enforcement
requires a lot more resources. 21 In some instances (e.g., Prohibition), society will
deem that expenditure of resources too costly (with the lack of support for the law
increasing the likelihood of that outcome).
In addition to the direct cost of enforcing a law that runs counter to social
norms, policy makers need to consider the indirect effects of laws that clash with
social norms. On the one hand, a common objection to changing laws that
conflict with norms is that such laws may have positive effects on social norms.
This effect is known as the law's "expressive function."'  Repeal could send the
wrong message by sanctioning the undesirable conduct in addition to legalizing it.
Laws that contradict social norms, however, also can produce harmful
secondary effects. As sociologist Tom Tyler documented in his landmark study
Darley, Utioy of Desert, supra note 15, at 468-71 (reviewing studies). As discussed in the next
section, deterrence-based incentives remain important, but primarily at the margins, among those
who are not otherwise inclined to comply with the law voluntarily, and at the threshold, for people
who are generally law-abiding because of moral conviction or risk-aversion.
"8 Catherine A. Sanderson & John M. Darley, 'IAm Moral, But You Are Deterred": Differential
Attribution About Why Peopk Oby the Law, 32 J. APPIiED Soc. PSYCHOL. 375, 375-88 (2002).
19 TYLER, spra note 17, at 36-37. See also Robinson & Darley, Uti&y of Desert, supra note 15,
at 468-71 (surveying research).
20 TYLER, supra note 17, at 37.
21 The problem is that a potential offender must be informed of the rule, he must be made to
believe that enforcement is likely, and he must believe the cost of the violation is greater than the
perceived benefit. Robinson & Darley, Role of Deterrence, supra note 15, at 953. As discussed earlier,
it is costly to generate a credible threat, especially given the information costs and people's tendency
toward undue optimism regarding their own prospects. Id at 954-55.
' Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory ofExpressive Law, 86 VA. L. REv. 1649, 1650-51
(2000). For other articles discussing the law's expressive function, see also Robert D. Cooter,
Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H.
McAdams, The Condorcet Jugy Theorem and the Expressive Funcion of Law: A Theory of Informative Law, 5
AMi. LAw & EcON. REV. 1 (2003); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alte,,aive Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI,
L. REV. 591 (1996); Richard H. McAdams,AnAttitudnalTheory ofExpressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339
(2000); McAdams, supra note 1, at 400-07; Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144
U. PA. L. REv. 2021 (1996).
7
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"Why People Obey the Law," people's perceptions of the law's fairness and justice
are informed in large part by their beliefs about the morality of the law.' At the
extremes, the government's legitimacy and the stability of society can be
undermined by strict enforcement of laws that contradict social norms.2 4 Less
dramatic but also important, enforcing laws that are perceived as unjust increases
the likelihood of disobedience of both the law in question and law generally, and
support for those who break the law. 5
A law that contradicts social norms can thus be costly to enforce, requiring
more resources to enforce than a comparable law that enjoys normative support.
Enforcement may also have the perverse effect of increasing law-breaking. All
these considerations dictate in favor of repealing or not enforcing laws that
contradict social norms.
However, the benefit side of the cost-benefit analysis must be considered
before repealing a law. Quite often, there was a good reason for enacting the law
in the first place despite the existence of social norms that defied the law among
part or most of the population. Take an example that raises some of the same
problems raised by Prohibition: drunk driving. People insist on drinking, and, in
the past, it was common and at least somewhat socially acceptable for people to
drive home after drinking. At first, enforcement campaigns against drunk driving
were not successful. Both the subjects of these laws-the general populace-and
the enforcers-police, judges, and juries-proved uncooperative. If the
inevitability of drinking, and social norms regarding it, were the sole determinant,
then drunk driving laws would have gone the way of Prohibition.
The difficulty is that the undesirable behavior regulated by the law can be
costly too. Drunk driving harms other people. It leads to lost lives, injuries and
resulting medical bills, property damage, and increased insurance costs. There
were thus good reasons to persist and to overcome normative resistance to the
law.
Moreover, the decision about what to do about a social norms-law clash
usually involves considerations beyond cost-benefit analysis-it has a moral
dimension.26 Drunk driving was not just unacceptably costly in pecuniary terms.
It also caused moral outrage. This outrage animated and gave moral authority to
groups like Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD). MADD kept the pressure
23 Cf. TYLER, supra note 17; see also Kahan, supra note 8, at 619; Robinson & Darley, Role of
Deterrence, supra note 15, at 985-87.
24 TYLER, supra note 17, at 23.
s See Kahan, spra note 8, at 619; Robinson & Darley, Rok of Deterrene, supra note 15, at 985-87.
Moral considerations are, in a sense, part of the cost-benefit analysis as they affect the utility
assigned to particular outcomes. However, because rational choice analysis often defaults to
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on policy makers to continue the enforcement campaign and it eventually enjoyed
some success.
27
A more shocking example further illustrates that widespread resistance to a law
does not dictate abandoning the law, provided that the moral stakes are
sufficiently high. Earlier this year, South Africa's Medical Research Council
conducted a survey that showed that a substantial minority of men surveyed in
two provinces of the Republic of South Africa (RSA) had committed rape.2"
Twenty-five percent of those surveyed admitted to having committed rape, with
nearly half that number admitting to more than one assault.2 9 Five percent
admitted to a rape in the previous year. 0 The report said "practices such as gang
rape were common because they were considered a form of male bonding.
31
Understandably and predictably, nobody responded with the assertion that the
RSA should legalize rape. The comment of Professor Rachel Jewkes, who
conducted the research, was illustrative: "The absolute imperative is we have to
change the underlying social attitudes that in a way have created a norm that
coercing women into sex is on some level acceptable. 32 This is not a problem
that allows for surrender to social norms, adaptation, or much consideration of
cost-benefit analysis (at least with regard to whether to act).
This author hastens to make it clear that filesharing or any other kind of
consumer copyright piracy is not equivalent to drunk driving and certainly not to
rape. That sort of distinction, however, is exactly the point of this discussion.
Sometimes norms can be allowed to prevail, but sometimes not. The answer to
whether to repeal the law is not dictated merely by the existence of resistance to
the law, and not even necessarily by a pecuniary cost-benefit analysis. Ultimately,
one must consider morality.
Finally, repealing or changing the law can prove to be politically impracticable.
Reliance on the current law and entrenched interests can generate opposition to
change. The American political system with its checks and balances tends to be
biased against change. Laws that enshrine an ideal can be hard for a politician to
oppose, even if they contradict people's behavior or his own. As the old maxim
goes, "Hypocrisy is the tribute that vice plays to virtue. 3 3 Thus, even if laws
7 See MADD, http://www.madd.org/About-Us/History.uspx (last visited Sept. 25, 2009)
(detailing the rise of the grassroots organization and its perseverance in the campaign against drunk
driving).
28 SoutbAfrican Rape Survgy Shock, BBC NEWS,June 18,2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/afri





31 Usually attributed to the Duc de La Rochefoucauld ("L'hypocrisie est un hommage que le
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against adultery or drug use are outmoded, no politician wants to be known for
making it safer to cheat on one's spouse or use drugs.
C. THE SURRENDER STRATEGY AND THE MUSIC BUSINESS
Surrender is not a likely option in the clash between law and social norms
arising from filesharing and other digital copying. In reverse order from the
considerations set forth in the previous part, politics cuts strongly against legalized
filesharing; moral arguments and cost-benefit analyses also do not cry out for
repeal of copyright protections for recorded music.
Wholesale reform of copyright is an infamously hard task. The last major
revision, which resulted in the 1976 Copyright Act, was decades in the making.
34
Moreover, many provisions of the Copyright Act enshrine specific industry
arrangements and the interests of particular players.35 Much of the Copyright Act
and many recent amendments were drafted after negotiation among the affected
parties.36 All this adds up to the fact that any radical change would face a
tremendous uphill battle against firmly entrenched interests that have a history of
protecting their positions. Political controversy would thus at least long delay any
effort to conform copyright law to permissive norms.
Moreover, while filesharing does not elicit the moral outrage reserved for
greater wrongdoing" it also hardly elicits moral support. The moral debate in
copyright lies elsewhere. Copyright law has numerous, passionate critics, but they
largely contend that copyright has expanded beyond justification in scope,
duration, and effects on the liberty of others.3" They are particularly concerned
that others are impeded in their ability to engage in further expressive,
transformative uses of earlier works.39 Others have criticized filesharing lawsuits
vice rend i la vertu" in the original French). LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, MAXIMS 65 (Leonard Tancock
trans., Penguin Classics 1982).
34 SeeJESSICA LfIAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT: PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ON THE
INTERNET 33 (Prometheus Books 2000) (1980).
35 Id.
3 Id
" With the notable exception of many musicians and others in the recording industry directly
affected by it.
38 See, e.g., NEIL NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX (Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (arguing that
copyright law as currently constituted impinges too much on free speech); YOCHAI BENKLER, THE
WEALTH OF NETWORKS (Yale Univ. Press 2007) (arguing that intellectual property rights may need
to yield to more cooperative forms of production); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG
MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
(Penguin Press 2004) (arguing that copyright law has become unbalanced, thus impeding the
creativity of those who would build on others' work).
39 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 38.
[Vol. 17:59
10
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol17/iss1/6
2009] RECONCILUNG SOCIAL NORMS AND COPYRIGHT LAW 69
and judgments as impractical and punitive, but at best they usually have few words
to say in support of filesharing itself.' There is also an extensive literature
regarding the moral justification for copyright,4 some of which argues for a
narrower scope of copyright.42 Nevertheless, while many seek to restrain
copyright's reach and effect, very few would advocate shrinking it so much as to
allow unrestrained filesharing.4"
Prominent proposals to transform copyright law have been motivated by
pragmatic instead of moral considerations, at least as concerns filesharing. The
most well-known proposals, advocated most notably by William Fisher and Neil
Netanel, would allow users to download recordings and other works freely. 
4
Copyright owners would be compensated from a pool of money accrued via taxes
or levies on recording media or equipment.45 Proponents of these proposals were
motivated by beliefs that filesharing was too pervasive and elusive to stop, rather
than moral justification of filesharing.
Despite several years of publicity, these blanket license proposals have never
gained much, if any, traction with legislators. Perhaps this shows that political
resistance to change is too strong, as suggested earlier. Perhaps instead, it merely
shows that the time for change has not quite yet arrived.
In any event, copyright law is unlikely to be transformed any time soon. It is
worth considering, as the remainder of this Article does, other options for
resolving the apparent clash between copyright law and social norms. Instead of
o See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 4.
41 See, e.g., PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Dartmouth Pub.
Com. 1996); Lawrence C. Becker, Desening To Own Intellectual Propery, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 609
(1993); William Fisher, Theories oflntellectualProperty, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL
THEORYOF PROPERTY 168 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001);Jeremy Waldron, FromAuthors to Copiers:
Indtidual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841,856 (1993); Alfred
C. Yen, Restoring the NaturalLaw: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 521 (1990);
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Propery, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988); Wendy J. Gordon, A
Property Right in Seff-Expression: Equaity and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102
YALE L.J. 1533 (1993); Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyights Moraly Justified? The Philosophy of
Propery Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 817 (1990).
42 See, e.g., DRAHOS, supra note 41; Gordon, supra note 41; Palmer, supra note 41.
41 But see MICHELE BOLDRINE & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2008) (arguing that intellectual property grants an unwarranted and
inefficient monopoly, the aims of which could be better served through first mover advantage and
other alternatives).
4WILLAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND THE FUTURE OF
ENTERTAINMENT 199-203 (Stanford Univ. Press 2004); Gervais, supra note 3, at 57-66. See generaly
Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyight: Napster and the New Economics of Digital
Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommerial Use Lety
To Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharin, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003).
41 See FISHER, spra note 44, at 217-23; Gervais, supra note 3, at 47; Ku, supra note 44, at 311-22.
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reconciling the law to social norms, it may be possible, and perhaps desirable, to
try to reconcile social norms to the law. The results are likely to be imperfect, and
the results quite "leaky"-copying will not ever stop entirely. Nevertheless, much
more can be done than many seem to think.
11. SURVEYING THE ALTERNATE STRATEGIES
Instead of surrendering to social norms, authorities and private rights holders
might choose to continue the fight by employing other strategies: increasing
deterrence; adaptive strategies that indirectly fight or exploit the norm; and
persuasion. This Part reviews each of those strategies and considers their
application to the music business.
A. DETERRENCE: RAMPING UP ENFORCEMENT AND PENALTIES
In some instances, those who enforce the law are not inclined to surrender to
social norms that run counter to the law. Instead, they increase enforcement or
seek harsher penalties in order to deter wrongdoing.
1. Deterrence Strategies in General. The recording industry's suits against file-
sharers are one well-known example directly relevant to this discussion, but other
(probably more successful) examples abound. Drunk driving has become both
less common and less socially acceptable as legislatures have increased penalties
and lowered thresholds for intoxication over the past few decades. The battle
against drunk driving thus represents a victory for the deterrence strategy,
although as discussed later, the drunk driving story also counsels that deterrence
strategies may need to be ratcheted up in steps in some instances and
accompanied by persuasion.'
Deterrence strategies enjoy several advantages: they are clear, direct, and rely
on existing laws. Authorities need only enforce a law that already exists instead
of persuading legislators to adopt the law, or using persuasion or indirect means
to change people's behavior. Even where proponents must persuade legislators
to increase penalties, the task is a bit harder but at least it focuses on a law that
likely has existing support (or it would not be a law in the first place). Moreover,
the strategy relies on variables that are amenable to direct manipulation:
enforcement and penalties. Authorities also can clearly communicate changes in
these variables to potential offenders.
These characteristics of the deterrence strategy have garnered it great support
in both practice and theory. The model is intuitively appealing: compliance with
See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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the law is a function of enforcement and penalties. People are more likely to
comply with a law as the perceived chance of getting caught increases and as the
negative consequences increase. As a folk model, it is the one most commonly
relied upon by legislators and law enforcement. As a formal model, it has long
been embraced by rational choice theorists.
The difficulty with the deterrence strategy is that several factors other than
enforcement and punishment affect people's decisions about complying with laws.
These other factors may be more important than enforcement and punishment.
First, people are more motivated by norms than law. This fact is generally quite
fortunate, because law and norms are generally in harmony.47 Thus, with respect
to most crimes, law enforcement need only concentrate resources on deterring the
minority that is willing to defy both norms and law.' The world would be a more
frightening place and police would be far busier if most people were inclined to
commit murder or robbery whenever they thought they could get away with it.
However, the influence of norms cuts the other way when they run counter to the
law. In such cases (e.g., Prohibition), policy makers and law enforcement find that
the baseline for compliance is much lower than with respect to other laws, and
thus they need to devote much greater resources to compliance.49
Another factor that interferes with the effectiveness of the deterrence strategy
is that authorities must persuade potential lawbreakers that they are likely to get
caught.5 ° And the potential lawbreaker must find the punishment too costly to
tolerate. However, people do not necessarily know about laws and tend to be
overly optimistic about their chances of evading detection.51 The result of these
problems is that marginal increases in enforcement or penalties do not necessarily
directly increase compliance. Authorities may already be getting most of the
compliance they can out of existing enforcement, and penalties and marginal
increases may yield diminishing returns at best.
47 See TYLER, supra note 17, at 22-23; see also LON L. FULLER, Human Interaction and the Lae, in
THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER 211, 233 (Kenneth I.
Winston ed., Duke Univ. Press 1981).
' For articles discussing this fact, see STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS:
LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY AND POLITICAL CHANGE (Yale Univ. Press 1974); David Easton, A Re-
assessment of the Concept of Pohlical Support, 5 BRIT. J. POL. SCi. 435 (1975); Richard L. Engstrom &
Michael W. Giles, Expectations and Images: A Note on Diffuse Support for Legal Institutions, 6 LAW &
SoC'Y REV. 631, 631 (1972); see, e.g., Talcott Parsons, Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social
Process, in SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY AND MODERN SOCIETY 264 (Ialcott Parsons ed., Free
Press 1967); Austin Sarat, Studying American Legal Culture: An Assessment of Survey Evidence, 11 LAW
& SOCkY REv. 427, 446 (1977).
49 See Robinson & Darley, Role of Deterrence, supra note 15, at 985--87.
s Id. at 954-55; Robinson & Darley, Utik y of Desert, supra note 15, at 461-62.
s Robinson & Darley, Utiit of Desert, supra note 15, at 461-62.
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Finally, penalties that are out of line with people's sense of fairness can be
counter-productive. As Professor Dan Kahan has argued, the experience with
drunk driving laws shows that norms may be influenced better by "gentle nudges"
than "hard shoves." 52 Initial attempts to dramatically increase enforcement and
penalties were met with resistance by those charged with enforcing the law.53
Police, prosecutors, judges, and juries were reluctant to enforce laws that strongly
contradicted their norms regarding drunk driving. The discretion in the system
thus gave norms scope to reduce the likelihood the law would be enforced, given
its divergence from norms. However, over time a different strategy worked.
Norms were brought along slowly by a more gradual ratcheting up of penalties
and enforcement, thus bringing us to the equilibrium we have today where fairly
strict laws enjoy widespread normative support.'"
Nevertheless, deterrence strategies can be worthwhile. It simply depends on
where enforcement and penalties are at the moment. Moving from zero or very
low enforcement to a credible threat of enforcement would certainly yield an
increase in compliance. First, there are likely boundary effects. As enforcement
moves from none to some amount greater than zero, some people who are very
risk averse or have a strong preference for obeying the law are likely to alter their
behavior.56 Second, theorists contend that the law has "expressive effects" that
influence social norms by signaling what is right.57 The existence of a completely
unenforced law is unlikely to yield such effects. Until people are aware of a law
and perceive enforcement and penalties as possible, few are likely to respond.
Deterrence strategies thus have their place. The challenge they present is in the
potentially large gap between initial effects and marginal changes that yield
significant increases in compliance. For most people to comply, they need to
know what the law is and receive some signal that authorities actually intend to
enforce it. However, once some enforcement and penalties are in place, it likely
will take a lot more penalties and enforcement to convince those who are
motivated mainly by those considerations. And if the penalties are too harsh, the
increase may have counter-productive effects, undermining support for the law.
2. The Recording Industry and Deterrence Strategies. This analysis yields, I hope, a
more balanced view of the recording industry's suits against filesharers than is
sometimes presented. The RIAA lawsuits were not necessarily foolish, and, in
fact, some sort of clear, visible act of enforcement was necessary. However, the
52 Kahan, supra note 8, at 607, 619.
53 Id.
'4 Id. at 634.
5s Robert J. MacCoun, Drugs and the Law: A P-ychological Analysis of Drug Prohibiion, 113
PSYCHOL. BuLL. 497, 501 (1993).
56 Id at 501, 503-04.
57 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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incomplete and modest success they achieved was about all anyone should have
expected from them.
If the recording industry had failed to make some strong, visible move to
enforce copyright, its inaction would have sent two unhelpful messages. First, the
practical message would have been that there were no consequences from
unauthorized distribution of recordings. Thus, there would have been no
deterrent against filesharing. Even at the peak of the RIAA suits, filesharers were
unlikely to get sued for filesharing. I calculated the odds several years ago; at the
time one was slightly more likely to get sued for filesharing than to be struck by
lightning, but the vanishingly small odds were comparable. Still, for some people,
any risk is unacceptable. There likely are boundary effects here, where any non-
zero risk is too much for some.
Moreover, failure to act would have sent the normative message that this
conduct, while theoretically objectionable, was not taken seriously enough to
warrant enforcement. When one considers the research that indicates most people
obey the law for normative reasons, it seems likely that a message of non-
condemnation would have exacerbated the filesharing problem greatly. As big as
the problem has been, millions of people still pay for music. While proving a
counter-factual is always difficult at best, the lack of normative condemnation
could have moved millions more to fileshare.
However, as necessary as some form of deterrent strategy may have been, it
was unlikely to have turned the tide on its own. First, purely as a deterrent, it was
not impressive. The number of lawsuits filed over the years was very large and
highly publicized, but it paled in comparison to the number of people filesharing
on any given day. Getting caught was simply very bad luck. One could rationally
view the risks as small, and, given a sufficient appetite for risk, quite acceptable.
Second, the normative messages have been mixed. One way in which people
form a sense of norms is through observing the actions of others. The lawsuits
increased publicity regarding the fact that millions of people were filesharing, thus
countering the normative message produced through enforcement. Moreover,
rationalizations and justifications for filesharing abounded among various
communities. The cumulative result was that for a large number of people,
filesharing remained normatively justified.
The music industry may have relied too much and too long on deterrence
strategies. As discussed further, there were additional approaches that the industry
could have tried, and is now trying with greater success.
B. ADAPTATION: FINDING OTHER WAYS TO CON43ATA LAW-NORMS DIVERGENCE
Two clichrs serve to frame the description of this strategy: "There's more than
one way to skin a cat," and, "If you can't beat 'em, join 'em." Sometimes law need
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not be abandoned nor enforced more aggressively, but rather, different
approaches need to be tried. Some of those approaches use indirect means to
attack the undesirable behavior directly sanctioned by law. Other approaches
essentially acquiesce to the undesired norm, while finding a way to mitigate its
consequences. Sometimes acquiescence results in a win-win outcome, while in
others it results merely in a standoff that mitigates the effects of the norm.
1. The Adaptaion Strategy in General. Indirect strategies for combating
undesirable behavior arising from unproductive social norms have proven
effective in law enforcement in recent years. In such strategies, authorities still
seek to achieve a goal embodied in a law that seems to clash with social norms, but
find that other, less direct means of combating the behavior are more effective.
For example, in some U.S. communities certain forms of unlawful
behavior-open drug dealing and gang activity-had arguably become the norm
by the late 1980s and early 1990s. While laws that targeted these behaviors have
multiplied and penalties have increased, alternatives like community policing and
other grassroots law-enforcement strategies have enjoyed some success. These
alternative strategies undermined serious criminal behavior indirectly, by enforcing
laws against petty crimes, cleaning up disorderly environments, and establishing
a police presence in the communities. 58 Unproductive social norms were thus
overcome with indirect attacks. 9
In other instances, it proves too costly to combat a norm, whether directly or
indirectly, and people instead adapt their behavior to mitigate the consequences.
For private parties, who have neither the power nor resources of government,
finding a way to live with the undesirable norm is often the only practical solution.
In these instances, private parties typically use self-help to adapt to social norms
that conflict with their legal rights.
In some instances, people can use self-help to turn an undesirable norm to
their advantage. Take the hypothetical case of a beachfront inn located on a
private strip of beach where the general public develops a norm of using the inn's
beachfront property. Although the trespass norm may disrupt and diminish the
inn owner's business, it may also prove too costly for her (or law enforcement) to
" See Carolyn Y. Johnson, Breakthrough on Broken Windows, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 8, 2009,
availabkathttp://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/artides/2009/02/08/breakthrough
_on_broken-windows/ (summarizing recent practical field experiments, as well as some of the
academic debate and controversy that has occurred about such strategies). These theories are widely
implemented by police departments but not universally embraced by academic researchers.
s' This strategy can also be modeled without reference to norms as simple deterrence strategy,
where criminal activity becomes more costly because of the police presence and general disruption
of enforcement of petty crimes. I really have no quarrel with this explanation for purposes of the
discussion here, as the point is that what seemed to be a norm that defied the law and standard
enforcement efforts was overcome with an indirect strategy.
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fight.' However, the norm also serves as a signal that the public values her beach.
She might respond to that signal by starting a business that takes advantage of the
crowds her beach draws. She thus might acquiesce to the use of her beach,
abandon her inn business, and instead might start a paid parking lot or a snack
stand.
In other instances, people cannot find a way to benefit from a norm and simply
must adapt their behavior to try to avoid harmful consequences. In the
beachfront property example above, if the owner cannot turn the trespassing
crowds to her profit then she might simply try to keep them out by enclosing her
property with a fence.6 This type of self-help, compelled by norms that support
lawbreaking, is utterly familiar and commonplace. For example, as lawbreaking
becomes widespread, people escalate their use of locks, fences, burglar bars, and
other anti-theft devices.62 In crime-ridden parts of the world, high walls, razor
wire, and glass shards embedded in walls are familiar sights. In some places,
norms regarding legal compliance adapt to counter norms of lawbreaking-for
example, in cities where people routinely run red lights to avoid carjacking.
Adaptive strategies certainly have their place in responding to undesirable
social norms. In some instances, authorities may find that clever, indirect tactics
for disrupting misconduct are more effective and less costly than directly
combating the misconduct itself. In other instances, people might find that it is
irrational to battle norms where one can actually benefit from them instead. In
still other instances, necessary precautions may represent an unfortunate, but
acceptable cost of a clash with social norms.
However, in other instances, adaptation may prove ineffective or too costly.
Take the earlier example of the beachfront property owner. If the revenue from
o The owner might call the police, but very persistent trespassing would make such a response
ineffective. Police are likely to have other priorities and would be unable and unwilling to engage
in constant patrolling of the beach. Similarly, the owner would likely find the cost of private
trespassing suits prohibitive if the number of trespassers was large and individuals difficult to
identify.
61 Of course, walking easements in many jurisdictions prevent such actions with respect to
beach property. Installing burglar bars or even simply locking one's car or house amount to the
same sort of self-help strategy.
62 These precautions lie along a spectrum, with the mildest precautions viewed as responses to
the risk of the occasional individual who defies law and norms to break the law, and the most
extreme viewed as a response to a perception of widespread crime. On the mild end of the
spectrum, as when people in a rural community begin to lock their doors at night for the first time,
one could hardly say that lawbreaking has become the norm. Rather, people are responding to a
perception that deviation from the norm is possible. However, at some point on the spectrum, the
extremity of response reflects a perception that crime has become, in some sense, the norm. When
people surround themselves with razor wire and security guards, commonly carry handguns, and
roll through red lights, the equilibrium has shifted from one where law breaking is a deviation from
the norm to one where law breaking has become normative for some part of the population.
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beach users is insufficient to pay mortgage obligations, taxes, or maintenance on
her property, then she cannot reach an accommodation with the norm of
trespassing on her beach. Similarly, if disobedience of law becomes so common
in a neighborhood that fences, locks, and other security measures do not suffice,
then people will simply abandon the neighborhood.
In the end, adaptation strategies work only if they offer a viable way of coping
with the problem. If they are too costly, then other strategies must be tried
instead of or in concert with adaptation.
2. The Recording Industry and Adaptation Strategies. Although many people
criticize the industry's lack of creativity in responding to digital copying, it actually
has attempted to employ a remarkable variety of adaptive strategies. The problem
has been that many of the responses were too timid and too slow, particularly in
light of the overwhelming challenge. In fact, the challenge was so great that it was
probably inevitable that effective responses would be difficult to employ. In any
event, effective adaptive responses were few and far between. This Part briefly
surveys some of the many adaptive strategies tried by the music industry. The
industry has tried all three-self-help through prevention or mitigation; indirect;
and win-win.
One adaptive approach the recording industry tried without much success was
to use self-help to prevent or mitigate the effect of copying through the use of
digital rights management (DRM). This strategy was akin to adding burglar bars
and better locks in a neighborhood where crime has increased. However, the
music industry was never really able to lock the door. Instead, DRM mostly was
an annoyance to paying customers and no barrier at all to filesharers. Most
famously, Sony enraged customers by including software on music CDs in 2005
that installed copy protection on users' computers without authorization.63 While
the Sony incident was a fiasco in every way possible,' other less infamous uses of
DRM on CDs simply proved to be more trouble than they were worth. Similarly,
DRM on legally-sold MP3 files from stores such as iTunes did little to help the
music business, although it did serve the interests of hardware manufacturers by
making it difficult for consumers to switch to other brands of MP3 players.
By 2008, DRM on recorded music had virtually disappeared.
There were two primary problems with the DRM strategy: it was too late and
it offered consumers nothing in return for putting up with the inconvenience it
created. For a time, DRM was a cause c~lbre among scholars and consumer
6 See Deirdre K. Mulligan & Aaron Perzanowski, The Magnficence of the Disaster:. Reconstructing
the Sony BMG Rootkit Inddent, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157 (2007).
' The incident is widely known as the "Sony Rootdt fiasco," with that exact search string
returning about 279,000 hits on Google as of August 2009.
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groups, who waged a battle against its unfairness and oppressiveness." However,
DRM seems to have failed on less philosophical and more practical grounds.
Unlike DVDs and DVD players, CDs and CD players were originally released
without a DRM scheme. DRM added inconvenience to digital music without any
corresponding improvement (unlike the move from VCRs to DVD players).
Moreover, DRM restrictions on MP3s were virtually useless as a security measure
because the files could still be obtained from ripped CDs. In the end, music DRM
as it functioned was utterly irrational because it impeded paying customers but not
filesharers. It was like a jewelry shop that employed a locked door and buzzer
system during business hours, but left the shop's door propped open all night.
The recording industry has also employed indirect enforcement strategies to
deter filesharers. Its earliest attempts were not promising. In 2002, it sought, by
means of a bill sponsored by Representative Howard Berman and Representative
Howard Coble, exemption from anti-hacking laws to attack the computers of
filesharers.6" This proposed safe harbor for vigilantism was much discussed and
protested, but never got far.
The industry's lawsuits against Napster, Grokster, and other filesharing services
were a somewhat more successful form of indirect enforcement. Their most
effective aspect of the suits (from an enforcement standpoint) was that they
interfered with consumers' opportunity to engage in unauthorized downloading
by disrupting and shutting down the most widely used, convenient services. 67 Of
course, the lawsuits against intermediaries were not a completely effective indirect
enforcement strategy, as consumers still were able to look for and find other
intermediaries such as ad hoc filesharing networks enabled by BitTorrent
technology. Even given that limitation, however, the suits against intermediaries
were a necessary and useful form of direct enforcement against competing
illegitimate distributors like Napster.
The industry's more recent efforts at indirect enforcement have begun to focus
on links in the distribution chain that are a step more removed from directly
confronting filesharers but that actually are more effective points to bring pressure
to bear. In some ways, these efforts are reminiscent of the previously-discussed
law enforcement strategies of the 1990s that attacked serious crimes by focusing
on remote issues such as cleaning up neighborhoods and suppression of petty
65 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 60 (2001) (arguing that DRM undermined the traditional structure of
copyright law).
6Declan McCullagh, CoumldHo4woodHack YourPC?, CNETNEWSJuly 23,2002, http://news.
cnet.com/2100-1023-945923.html.
67 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (causing Napster to
shut down); see also MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (holding P2P
fileshating a violation of copyright law).
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crimes.68 The entertainment industry's initial forays into indirect enforcement
were to cooperate with universities to dissuade students from filesharing.6 9
University networks were overburdened with students using them for filesharing,
so many universities were happy to threaten filesharers identified by the music
industry with loss of network privileges and other academic sanctions. More
controversially, the recording industry managed to enshrine this strategy in law
with the Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008.70 This Act imposes duties
on universities to warn students of sanctions for copyright infringement and to
develop plans to "effectively combat the unauthorized distribution of copyrighted
material, including through the use of a variety of technology-based deterrents." 7
They must also "to the extent practicable" provide alternatives to illegal
downloading or peer-to-peer sharing of copyrighted material.72
Most recently, the recording industry has sought to use internet access as the
pressure point for indirect enforcement.73 Some U.S. internet service providers
(ISPs) have been voluntarily cooperating to send warning notices to filesharers on
their network.74 They have, however, balked at taking the program further to
implement a "three strikes" plan to cut off customers who are repeat offenders
after being warned. Similarly, the British and French governments have recently
proposed to implement three-strike plans.75 However, these plans have been met
with howls of protests, and a French court has struck down the initial version of
the French law.76 The ISPs' initial interest in cooperation arises in part out of a
coincidence of interest between them and the recording industry. Filesharers use
a lot of network resources, so reducing their impact relieves pressure on ISP
resources. ISPs have also begun to act as content distributors, so they increasingly
have a stake in suppressing free, unauthorized competition. However, the
coincidence of interests between ISPs and the recording industry only goes so far.
While ISPs are happy to reduce network congestion and encourage alternate
revenues sources, they are reluctant to alienate and discard paying customers.
S See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
69 See, e.g., Stefanie Olsen, Hollywood's new lesson for campus file swappers, CNET NEWS, Apr. 19,
2004, http://news.cnet.com/2100-1027_3-5194341.htm (noting the use of software that makes
detecting unauthorized use of copyrighted work easier).
70 Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 111-39, 123 Stat. 1394 (2009).
71 Id. §§ 485, 487.
72 Id § 487(a)(29).
73 See The Spider and tbe Web, ECONOMisT, Aug. 27,2009; Chloe Albanesius, Comcast, Others Deny
'Three Strikes"Piray Plan, PCMAG.COM, Mar. 27, 2009, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,234
3977,00.asp.
74 See Albanesius, supra note 73.
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These indirect enforcement strategies can be incredibly effective. ISPs and
university network administrators can cheaply and effectively verify the identity
of filesharers and have the ability to impose effective sanctions.
The downside of such indirect enforcement strategies arises from their
indirectness. They impose enforcement costs and responsibilities on third parties
rather than the copyright owners, who enjoy most of the benefits. Moreover, as
currently envisioned and practiced, these processes do not afford consumers the
protections of standards of legal proof or due process. The sanctions are also not
necessarily directly proportional to the act of infringement-the punishment does
not fit the crime. Dismissal from university or complete cutoff from the
internet-increasingly a necessity in industrialized countries-strikes many as
unduly harsh.
These indirect strategies, although potentially effective, are thus likely to be
curtailed by resistance from those who bear the costs. The intermediaries
responsible for enforcement are balking at full voluntary cooperation, and when
the strategies are imposed, some will fight full application in the political process
and the courts.
In the end, the most productive adaptive strategies have been new business
models-the vehicles the music industry has used to turn changing consumer
behavior and preferences into win-win outcomes. Like the hypothetical
beachfront inn owner discussed earlier, social norms that defied property rights
(i.e., filesharing) have served as a signal and sometimes an opportunity. Arguably,
filesharing was not needed to tell the music industry that digital distribution
presented a transformative opportunity as well as a challenge. The difficulty,
however, is that revolutionary change rarely arises from industry incumbents.
Path dependence is a powerful force, and even businesspeople prefer to continue
in familiar arrangements if they can. Filesharing forced the issue.
The most successful new business model so far has been the sale of digital
music files via online stores, most notably iTunes.77 This model was in many ways
unremarkable-it simply shifted distribution from physical means to digital.
However, iTunes was important as it undermined part of the appeal of filesharing.
Like filesharing services, it satisfied consumer demand for a user-friendly,
comprehensive source of music that provided nearly instant gratification. Unlike
filesharing services, it was wholly legitimate. It gave consumers the opportunity
to comply with the law, and thus allowed some to break the habit of violating the
law, and prevented others from ever engaging in unauthorized behavior. This
outcome was part of SteveJobs's business case for iTunes-he was optimistic that
7 See Glen Emerson Morris, The Apple iTunes Music Store: How Apple Got It Right, http://
www.ad-mkt-review.com/pubfic-html/air/ai200308.html (last visited Sept 25, 2009) (touting the
success of iTunes).
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iTunes could compete with filesharing because he believed that some people
would prefer to comply with the law.7 ' He was right-iTunes and its competitors
created a norm that competes with filesharing.
The other major business response to filesharing has been the subscription
services. So far these flat-fee streaming and downloading services have had
limited traction. There is speculation that they may dominate the future, as
devices like the iPhone allow consumers to stay connected to the internet
ubiquitously and constantly. As of this writing, the Spotify streaming service has
proven to be very popular in Europe and will eventually reach the United States.
Such services also undermine the filesharing norm by providing an alternative that
provides many of the same benefits as filesharing (and perhaps more, given the
convenient and constant access they offer).
Many have also suggested that filesharing can actually benefit the music
industry by providing free advertising for recorded music, and perhaps more
importantly, for related businesses such as live performance. There are indeed
many cases where individual artists have benefited from giving away their music
on filesharing networks. For example, filesharing networks allowed Wilco to build
support for its acclaimed album "Yankee Hotel Foxtrot" after it was rejected by
their label. The U.K.-based Arctic Monkeys broke out by giving away their music
on filesharing networks, garnering a record deal and enjoying a record-setting
debut on U.K. charts. Other bands, like Def Leppard, are finding new fans for
their live performances as younger people discover their old hits on filesharing
networks.
While these are examples of great successes for individual artists, the results are
less promising for the industry as a whole. Wilco and the Arctic Monkeys were
able to improve their position in the existing recording industry vis-i-vis
competing artists. Def Leppard was able to re-purpose a well-exploited asset (its
old hits) to improve its position in another business, the nostalgia performance
circuit. None of these examples show a large alternative revenue source that will
replace the recording business undermined by filesharing. I discussed these
challenges at length in an earlier paper entitled "Copyright, Live Performance, and
the Future of the Music Business." 79 In sum, while touring can be a lucrative
business for some, there are many inherent limits to its ability to support, on its
own, a large, diverse recording business. Giving away recordings on filesharing
78 Jeff Goodell, Steve Jobs: The Rolling Stone Intenjew, ROLUNG STONE, Dec. 3, 2003, availab at
http://www.roUlingstone.com/news/story/5939600/steve-jobs-the-roling- stone-?md=l 14&md
=1 142310630610&has-player=true&version=6.0.12.1-040.
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networks in hopes of deriving ancillary benefits is likely to prove to be a limited
way to turn filesharing norms to the benefit of the music business.
Of course, there are some far more radical strategies that involve going directly
to fans, such as Radiohead's celebrated experiment in allowing fans to name their
own price (including zero) for its "In Rainbows" album.' Such strategies strike
me more as forms of persuasion, ways of convincing fans to buy music based on
building a relationship with an artist. These strategies are probably the most
underexploited and fastest growing alternatives for combating filesharing.
C. PERSUASION: CHANGING NORMS
Sometimes, when law and social norms clash, it is norms that eventually give
way to the law. Social norms clearly evolve and change, although the mechanisms
that catalyze change are varied, hard to predict, and imperfectly understood.
Nevertheless, there are some instances where concerted action by officials and
civil society can affect norms.
1. The Persuasion Strategy in General. There are many factors that shape social
norms. The research on the topic is vast and the possibilities many, but the
following suggests a few possibilities that are particularly relevant to private actors
such as the music industry that are trying to persuade people to change their
behavior.
Education. Public service announcements, public demonstrations, and other
forms of education are the persuasive strategies that likely come to mind first and
most commonly. As the most familiar, they need the least explanation. Still, it is
worth noting that education can help in shaping what the literature calls
"injunctive norms." Injunctive norms embody people's understanding of what is
viewed as "right" behavior by authority figures such as family, moral, and religious
authorities, professional and social peers, and the mass media." People often look
to injunctive norms to decide whether to behave out of an internalized sense of
morality (i.e., a conscience) or because they fear condemnation and loss of social
status.82 Education is useful and necessary to shaping injunctive norms, as it helps
to communicate to people what is expected of them.
Of course, education may fail, as people may not be convinced that the
injunctive norm asserted should govern their behavior. The message can be seen
as self-serving and thus dubious. Or it may be overcome by contradictory
messages arising from the behavior of peers (the "descriptive norms" discussed
o Eliot Van Buskirk, Radhobead's In Rainbows Outsold Previous Albums Despite Giveaway, WIRED,
Oct. 16, 2008, http://wired.com/listening-post/2008/lO/radioheads-in-r/.
81 See Cialdini et al., supra note 14, at 201.
8 Id; TYLER, supra note 17, at 24-25.
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next). Peer groups may send a contradictory message regarding injunctive norms,
or a person may have a different, contradictory moral compass.
Perceptions Regarding Peer Behavior. People also take their cues from what they
perceive others to be doing-these are sometimes referred to as "descriptive
norms." 3 People likely follow descriptive norms because they look to peer group
behavior for cues on how to behave or because they have an innate instinct to
imitate one another.'
Descriptive norms may seem to represent a self-reinforcing trap for those who
seek to alter norms, but the key point of leverage is that people take their cues
from their perceptions of others' behavior. The goal is thus to shape that
perception. Those who seek to change norms actually need to be careful about
the message they send regarding general compliance. Researchers have pointed
out that dramatic messages regarding the deplorable behavior of others may have
a counterproductive effect.8 5 For example, an anti-littering commercial that shows
a landscape covered with litter may cause people to believe littering is acceptable,
common behavior.'"
Instead, those seeking to persuade need to show that most people are
complying. A famous successful experiment in shaping perceptions of compliance
was conducted by the Minnesota Department of Revenue.8" Researchers sent
taxpayers a letter that asserted that the overwhelming majority of people comply
with the tax laws. Those who received the letter paid taxes at a higher rate than
the control group.
The Relevant Peer Group. People look to their peers to determine both injunctive
norms (what their peers say is right) and descriptive norms (what their peers
actually do), but the important question is which peer group will influence people's
norms. Experience tells us that peer groups are not monolithic in their norms.
Thus, the peer group with whom somebody identifies matters greatly to norm
compliance.8 " Social networks and their norms can either complement or subvert
laws or the norms of society in general.8 9
" Cialdini et al., supra note 14.
84 Id.
8s Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Colkective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 342 (2001).
s' Cialdini et al., supra note 14.
87 See STEPHEN COLEMAN, THE MINNESOTA INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE EXPERIMENT: STATE
TAX RESULTS 18-19, 25 (1996), http://www.taxes.state.mn.us/taxes/legal-policy/research-repo
rts/content/complnce.pdf; Kahan, supra note 85, at 340-41.
' See Mark Granovetter, EconomicAction and SodalStructure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM.
J. Soc. 481 (1985).
89 See Victor Nee & Paul Ingram, Embeddedness and Bgyond" Institutions, Exchange, and Social
Structure, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN SOCIOLOGY 247,248 (Mary C. Brinton & Victor Nee,
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Those seeking to shape norms most likely can benefit from fostering
community ties among a group that supports the norm. Research shows that
geographic and social proximity are important factors in determining the influence
of peers.9°  The internet has greatly enhanced the opportunity to build
communities, and it thus may provide a concomitant opportunity to shape norms.
Recprody. People's normative choices are also shaped by their perceptions of
how fairly and cooperatively others are behaving. This set of behavioral
characteristics is often referred to as "reciprocity."'" An equilibrium of
opportunism or cooperation can prevail depending on whether conditions are
right for reciprocity.
According to research, people tend to enter a new situation inclined to
cooperate. Reciprocity will tend to sustain that cooperation unless people are seen
to be getting away with acting opportunistically. One way to reinforce
cooperation is to encourage a community to help enforce cooperation. People are
willing to enforce cooperation, even if it costs them something to do so.
Conversely, people will walk away from a situation from which they receive
benefits if they perceive that others are getting away with behaving unfairly.92
2. Persuasive Strategies and the Music Industry. Members of the music industry
have begun to employ a number of interesting persuasive strategies. The industry
has long employed standard educational strategies to combat filesharing and
unauthorized copying. Little needs to be said about such familiar and ubiquitous
strategies. However, persuasion has begun to work more subtly on norms as
some music industry players have re-shaped their business models and practices
to forge closer relationships with fans.
In an earlier case study, I found that "jambands" and their fans had built a
community with norms that encouraged respect for the artists' rights.93 Jambands
(e.g., the Grateful Dead, Phish) allow their fans to tape live performances and to
trade the live recordings. The fan community in turn encouraged respect for the
copyright of the bands' commercial recordings and compliance with the bands'
90 Bibb Latane et al., Distance Matters: Physical Space and Sodal Impact, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 795 (1995); Robert Axelrod, Rick L. Rolo & Michael D. Cohen, Bgyond Geograpby:
Cooperation with Persistent links in the Absence of Clustered Neighborhoods, 6 PERSONALiTY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. REv. 341 (2002).
9" See Mark F. Schultz, Fears and Norms and Rock & Roll. What Jambands Can Teach Us About
Persuading People to Obey Copyight Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651, 693 (2006) (collecting and
summarizing studies regarding reciprocity).
92 Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Appropriating the Commons: A Theoretical
Explanation, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS 157, 158-59 (Elinor Ostrom et al. eds., Nat'l Acad.
Press, 2002); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Fairness and Retak&ation: The Economics ofReciprocity, 14 J.
EcON. PERSP. 159, 159-60 (2000).
9' See Schultz, supra note 91, at 653 (discussing case study).
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rules regarding use of their live recordings (e.g., non-commercial copying only).
The remarkable level of respect was demonstrated by business decisions that few
other artists dared try at the time like releasing digital tracks online without copy
protection.
A few lessons could be generalized from the jamband experience, which I
theorized built upon reciprocity to encourage cooperative norms:
• Build communities and close relationships with fans. Jambands
tended to give their fans unusually high amounts of access to the
bands. Direct communication and long-term relationships were
hallmarks of this community.
" Improve perceptions of fairness. Besides giving away live
recordings, the bands tended to keep ticket prices low, offer fans
opportunities at choice seating, and provide other benefits. Fans
perceived the treatment as fair and tended to advocate fair
treatment in return.
• Get the fans involved in enforcement. Fans helped to run the fan
community. They informed each other of the rules and enforced
them through social sanctions. Some even contacted legal counsel
for the bands to assist with enforcement against bootlegging.
In sum, these bands had built a community that sustained and supported their
careers and respected their rights. These bands likely were not following a
calculated strategy with respect to copyright compliance, but have certainly
benefitted from the relationship of trust they have built with their fans.
Other artists have now followed similar strategies. The most dramatic example
was Radiohead's "name your own price" release of its album "In Rainbows." One
might have predicted that everybody would have chosen a zero price. Instead, the
band made large amounts of money.94
Reciprocity appears to be the likely explanation for the behavior of Radiohead
fans. They perceived the band as acting fairly and chose to act fairly in return,
rather than opportunistically. Of course, there may be questions as to how a
lesser-known artist might do what Radiohead did. After all, Radiohead had
already built a large community of fans through years of touring and major label
promotion before it decided to go it alone.
However, some lesser-known artists have also had success with building closer
ties to their fans. Two recently turned to their fans to fund their recordings. Jill
Sobule financed her own recording in 2008 through a fundraising drive with her
"' See supra note 80.
[Vol. 17:59
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fans.9" Different levels of contributions netted increasing benefits from Sobule:
The perks included t-shirts, live performances, and the opportunity to sing
background vocals on the album. She raised $75,000. Nine Inch Nails drummer
Josh Freese recorded a solo album using the same strategy. His benefits were
more whimsical-including meals at the Cheesecake Factory with him, a trip to
Disneyland, and the opportunity to hang out and drink with him and his more
famous musician friends.96
Imogen Heap is another lesser-known artist who appears to be benefitting
from an array of community building strategies. Heap has worked hard to use
modern social networking tools to build a network of close-and paying-fans. 97
For her latest album, Heap chronicled every step of her recording process via
Twitter. She spoke candidly of her challenges, asked fans for advice, and
responded with thanks. She also maintained a regular video blog on Twitter,
which chronicled not only her album but also her daily life. "As fans became
more and more engaged in the making of Heap's album and the virtually, real
friendship they shared with her, Heap allowed them to participate even further in
the making of" her latest album.98 She then had fans submit photos to Flickr in
a contest to design her album artwork. Winners received cash prizes and were
acknowledged in the album credits.
Heap now has a loyal community of fans, and this community was willing to
help her defend her rights, much like the jamband fans described earlier. When
one of the promotional copies of her album showed up in an eBay auction before
the release date, her fans notified her via Twitter.99 Her fans engaged in guerilla
bidding on her behalf, with a large group bidding the auction price up to
$10,000,000 before eBay pulled the listing.'0°
Heap continued to promote her album with more connections to her fans. She
organized live group meetings among her Twitter followers where she signed
autographs. She started a weekly live video chat and performance for fans.
Heap's promotion appears to have been successful. Her album debuted in late
August 2009 on the U.S. Billboard Chart at number five. While the record charts
are not what they used to be, this was still a remarkable achievement for a relative
" Jill Sobuk and Josh Freese, Have Fun With Marketing, Future of Music Coalition Blog (Mar. 26,
2009), http://futureofmusic.org/blog/2O9/03/26/ jill-sobule-and-josh-freese-have-fun-marketing.
9 Lewis Wallace, Drummer's Cray Album Extras Take Freemium'to Weirdvile, WIRED, Mar. 23,
2009, http://www.wired.com/underwire/2009/03/drummers-crazy/.
" Colette Weintraub, The New Music Business Modek Imogen Heap, DEEP DIVE MARKETING,
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unknown whose promotion was largely self conducted. More important, she
established a connection with her fans and was rewarded with reciprocally fair
treatment.
Most artists probably would not try anything quite as exotic as Radiohead's
pricing strategy or engage fans quite as intensely as Imogen Heap. But the future
is likely to include a lot more direct artist-fan connection. Distant, record label
intermediated marketing is less likely to build the sort of connection necessary to
convince people to pay for music. However, if people are made to feel part of a
community and in a relationship with an artist, a more positive, copyright-and-
artist respecting social norm is more likely to arise.
While customer loyalty is always desired by a business, this kind of deep loyalty
is particularly important when paying for the product seems to be voluntary (or
is voluntary, as Radiohead briefly made it). A core of loyal, paying fans can sustain
an artist, even if casual outsiders try out the music without paying. Community-
building may thus become an essential part of career building for at least some
artists.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RECONCILING COPYRIGHT LAW AND
COPYNORMS FOR RECORDED MUSIC
So far, this Article has addressed separately each of four options for
responding to a law-norms split. Bridging the gap between copyright law and
social norms regarding copying recordings is likely to require a combination of
several elements. It is impossible to know what form a successful business model
might take (and prudent people would not turn to most law professors for
business advice), but the broad outlines of the combined legal and business
approaches are discernible.
First, the strategy will likely include some forms of enforcement, both direct
and indirect, to keep everybody honest and to give some breathing room for
alternative business models to grow and thrive. Thus, the industry must continue
to fight any future Napsters or Groksters to avoid having its efforts to change
norms undermined by their competition. (Unless, that is, such competitors can
be co-opted via the adaptive strategy into authorized, revenue-producing partners.)
In addition, consumers may need some "stick" to accompany the carrots given as
part of the other strategy. While the resumption of the RIAA's lawsuits against
filesharers seems neither likely nor necessary at the moment, law-abiding
consumers cannot be allowed to feel they are "suckers" for paying for music. If
there is not some level of visible enforcement, the equilibrium is likely to
deteriorate toward non-compliance.
Second, the cooperation of ISPs and other intermediaries in enforcement
would greatly aid copyright owners, but they should not depend on it as a "silver
[Vol. 17:59
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bullet." Although voluntary cooperation could be extremely effective, copyright
owners probably should have modest expectations. Intermediaries will only
cooperate to the extent that doing so is in their interests. For example, ISPs are
happy to lighten the load on their networks, but do not want to lose customers.
If copyright owners attempt to impose further responsibilities on intermediaries
via legislation, they can expect a bitter fight they may not win. In most instances,
it is hard to make a legal or policy case for imposing most of the burden of
enforcement on largely innocent intermediaries.
Third, copyright owners must offer consumers a compelling alternative to
filesharing to reduce the necessity of enforcement and increase voluntary
compliance. Of course, that statement is absurdly easy to make and difficult to
implement. Still, the law and social norms literature can contribute a bit to the
task. Many artists in the future likely will need to build and sustain a close, strong
relationship with a fan community. Some of the hallmarks of this relationship will
include perceptions of fair treatment and involvement of the fans in enforcing
norms of respect for the artists' rights.
Taken together, these strategies may allow the music industry (whatever and
whoever that may be in the future) to find its way to a reconciliation of social
norms to copyright law. Much experimentation is likely to be necessary, and it is
hard to envision a complete and perfect solution. However, there is a possibility
to turn social norms more firmly toward compliance with copyright law in spite
of a system that is likely to remain quite "leaky."
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article suggests that many scholars and commentators have been too
quick to claim that copyright must be reformed because of an irreconcilable clash
with social norms, as evidenced by the persistence and size of the filesharing
problem. There are indeed good reasons to consider changing a law when it
clashes with social norms. Such clashes can be disruptive and costly. However,
there are other options that ought to be considered first.
This Article surveys the four options available when norms clash with the law:
"surrender," which consists of changing the law; "deterrence," which consists of
ratcheting up penalties and enforcement; "adaptation," which consists of finding
indirect ways to combat or accommodate social norms; and "persuasion," which
consists of strategies for persuading people to adopt or comply with more
cooperative norms. None of these strategies is necessarily superior to the others.
Their appropriateness depends on context.
In the context of the recording industry's problems with copyright compliance,
the latter three strategies-deterrence, adaptation, and persuasion are likely most
appropriate. Abandoning or transforming copyright law to accommodate
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filesharing is unlikely to be a viable option any time soon, given political resistance
and the lack of a moral case for it. Instead, a strategy that combines deterrence,
adaptation, and persuasion may be more effective for now.
Of the three strategies, persuasion holds the most promise, as it is the least
explored so far. Deterrence has been thoroughly attempted, via suits against
individual filesharers and intermediaries such as Grokster. Although some
credible deterrent was and remains necessary, such enforcement efforts can only
do so much (and may be counter-productive) without adaptation and persuasion
to bring norms more into line. Adaptation to changing circumstances is necessary
for all businesses, and none more than a business that faces the enormous
challenges that the music industry does. Ultimately, however, at least some fans
need to be persuaded to pay for music. Thus, efforts to build fan support through
more direct artist contact, community building, and other efforts that increase
loyalty will likely prove to be essential parts of a strategy for many parts of the
recording industry.
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